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Both the EU and the US have laws and rules intended to promote competition by 
discouraging monopolies and both sets of rules have similar "anti-trust" character. In the 
case of the EU, Community law contains general anti-trust provisions, provisions for the 
control of mergers and concentrations, provisions restricting state aids, and particular 
rules applying to public undertakings.1 American anti-trust law covers similar ground 
with respect to competition, monopolies, mergers, collusive practices, price 
discrimination and exclusionary practices. 
However, American anti-trust law says nothing about state aids or about pre-emptive 
control of subsidies by any level of government. The law's silence on this topic might 
seem paradoxical. Since the ideology behind anti-trust is so clearly an exaltation of free 
competition in a market economy, one would expect an explicit and stringent restriction 
of subsidies in American anti-trust law, alongside the suspicion of economic 
concentration that is so apparent. But the very strength of the ideology may it self explain 
the law's silence: the notion of government subsidy - at least so described - is sufficiently 
alien that law-makers have not even paused to consider its prohibition or restriction. 
The historical background of anti-trust: 
The scope of US anti-trust law derives historically from anxieties and ideals quite 
different from those that have shaped the European Union. Historically, anti-trust 
originated from the economic disorder that followed the Civil War. The misfortunes of 
farmers and small businesses were contrasted with the prosperity and growing market 
power of large industrial corporations, organized as trusts. It was this situation, and the 
fears and resentments it bred, that led to the adoption of anti-trust legislation, first by 
individual states and eventually, in 1890, by Congress in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
This Act, and a number of amendments introduced over the years, constitutes the 
legislative framework of U.S. competition policy. 
This ideological and historical background indicates that American anti-trust policy was 
not conceived as instrumental to the creation and maintenance of a market operated in 
common by various economic actors and public actors. A single market - at leas t as concerns the free circulation of goods - had existed to a certain degree in the U.S. since 
the establishment of the Union itself. Legislators framed anti-trust legislation in order to 
protect this market from supposedly "unnatural" distortions caused by the strength of the 
most powerful actors. 
The preoccupation with a free market also accounts for the occasional criticism that anti-
trust regulations, like all government intervention, have attracted in the US as 
"counterproductive" and "overregulatory." Yet even those who criticize the costs, the 
efficacy and the consistency of anti-trust legislation do not call for the abolition of the 
federal machinery to deal with anti-trust issues.  
The historical background of European integration: 
In contrast to the American preoccupation with a free market, European integration has 
been driven by the ideal of creating a single market - an ideal that competition policy and 
merger control (among other legislation) is intended to advance. 
The dismantling of customs barriers between the Member-States, as well as the abolition 
of a wide variety of regulatory and technical obstacles, has had a pivotal role in the 
progress of European integration. The free circulation of goods, services and capital, 
along with the free movement of workers, has made possible the creation of a common 
identity, if not yet a sense of common citizenship. 
In this context, the protection of competition cannot be seen as an end in itself. Rather, it 
is one of the general and related objectives of the Treaties and is a prerequisite for the 
proper functioning of the common market.2 The existence of separate national markets 
within the Community prior to integration, and the persistence of competition between 
them and between state-supported firms within national markets, necessarily led those 
pursuing integration to focus on state subsidies as a way of eliminating obstacles to fair 
and effective competition. Trade liberalization required an appropriate cross-border 
competition policy, which in turn called for control of subsidies. 
While state aid is still a conspicuous feature of European economies - representing some 
ECU 90 billion (2% of Community GDP) between 1988 and 1990 - the EU Commission 
has become much more active in containing and regulating subsidies. Until the 1970s, the 
Commission was fairly inactive in this field, examining annually fewer than fifty cases. 
The number of cases reported has grown steadily since the second half of the 1980s, in 
connection with the strengthening of enforcement by the Commission and the pressures 
resulting from adoption of the program for completion of the single market by 1992.  
Now some 600-700 cases are examined annually. Though relatively few lead to findings 
critical of the practices examined, increased monitoring on the part of the Commission 
has caused Member-State governments to restrict state aids to forms and levels mo re 
consistent with Community standards. Overall, the Commission's power to control 
subsidies by national governments is unique among the world's competition authorities. Do subsidies exist in the US? 
While the EU has taken broad powers to control subsidies, the US (as noted above) does 
not have anti-trust legislation restraining and restricting subsidies. It is clear that in the 
EU such controls respond to a reality of persistent and widespread government 
subsidization.  
But does the lack of such controls in the US imply a corresponding lack of subsidies, in 
function if not in title? And does the lack of formal controls imply a lack of alternative 
public means of restraining types of government assistance that, in function if not in title, 
provide assistance to businesses? 
The truth is that in the US various forms of subsidy occur that in the EU would attract the 
attention of the Commission as representing forms of state aid. Typically, they are 
justified as supporting either "industrial policy" or "regional development" and they 
represent in aggregate substantial public expenditure. However, such subsidies do not 
qualify for consideration by the agencies with authority for implementing anti-trust law.  
Though the use and extent of such subsidies may be surprising to Europeans - given the 
historical American attitude to the free market - both are familiar to politicians and 
students of economic policy in the US. Their existence and rationale have, indeed, 
recently come under attack following the establishment of a Republican majority in the 
US Congress in November 1994.  
Comparison with subsidies in Europe should be made cautiously, since industrial and 
development plans in the US often combine aid (in the European sense) with broader 
fiscal and educational expenditure and spending on infrastructure. 
This said, some examples of government actions intended to influence decision-making 
by business might include, in 1993 alone: 
1.  grants totaling more than $360 million by the City of New York to keep 
enterprises from moving elsewhere;  
2.  the establishment by the state of New Jersey of a $234 million economic 
development fund designed to stimulate new economic initiatives; and  
3.  an offering by the state of Kentucky (in competition with its rivals, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania) of a package of tax credits, low-interest loans and new roads that 
represented an investment of some $350,000 for each of 400 jobs to be created by 
the establishment of a new steel plant by a Canadian corporation. 
Comparable to the last example was the $37 million package of incentives offered in 
1994 by the State of Indiana to Steel Dynamics, Inc., to persuade the company to 
construct a 600-employee steel mill in the state (rather than in Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio or 
Michigan). Packages of this type commonly offer tax credits to allow businesses to recoup the cost of 
new buildings, low-interest loans, and substantial tax deductions allowed on the costs of 
moving a firm's operations into a new area.  
Criticism of incentive packages may simply assert that they are inappropriate in a free 
market economy. More recently, however, they tend to focus on the strategic wisdom of 
the approach, quite apart from its conformity with "American ideology”; For example, it 
is argued that bidding wars between states are self-defeating. They have not, in fact, 
reduced regional disparities since the wealthier states can always outbid their neighbors, 
but they certainly push up the costs for the public exchequer of job creation. Indeed, such 
packages may be not only costly but irrelevant, since the companies concerned may make 
their decisions on grounds other than the size of the incentive package offered by 
particular states.  
Finally, incentive schemes tend to reward the most mobile firms without requiring or 
inducing them to become rooted in a locality. Firms that are mobile do not cease to be so 
just because they have taken advantage of incentive packages offered by states or lower-
level governments. In several cases, firms have moved on, leaving relatively poor states 
or counties facing long-term indebtedness as a result of large incentive packages. 
Striking figures for the magnitude of subsidies to particular sectors have come to light 
during the recent debate on cuts in the federal budget. The larger sectoral subsidies 
include: 
1.  $45.3 billion for agricultural programs; 
2.  $42.5 billion for the energy industry; 
3.  $41.6 billion for transportation; 
4.  $27.1 billion for aerospace and high-technology firms; and 
5.  $24.7 billion for the construction industry.  
In addition, a further $140.7 billion has been provided for a variety of projects and 
industries through offshore tax exemptions and fiscal deductions. 
In the following sections, we examine the incidence and impact of subsidies in particular 
areas of business development. 
(a) Research and development: 
Research and development provides a good example of the distortions created by 
government policy and illustrates the "hidden dimension" of competition policy in the 
US. 
In 1993, projected expenditure from US government sources in support of R&D activities 
totaled $76 billion. This public contribution to scientific research covers both basic and 
applied scientific research and amounts to 46% of total national expenditure on R&D in 
1993. As the beneficiaries of the subsidies in question include federal agencies, national laboratories, and non-profit universities, in addition to private sector research bodies, the 
rationale for government policy is that the taxpayers benefit twice from governmental 
support for R&D. First, taxpayers benefit from the achievements of government agencies. 
Secondly, taxpayers earn royalties or profits from the discoveries and their spin-offs 
when they enter the market as commercial goods. 
This logic - resting upon the traditional right of government to the fruits of R&D it helps 
to fund - has been shaken by what can be described as the privatization of public 
technology.  
Though no legal prohibition existed on exclusive marketing licenses for publicly funded 
technology prior to 1980, no such licenses were granted because the concession of 
exclusive use would raise clear anti-trust issues. 
More recently, however, the business community has managed to win exclusive 
marketing licenses for publicly financed technology. Apparently, this has happened 
because several large corporations campaigned for transferring the products of federally 
funded R&D to the private sector. Such corporations argued that valuable inventions 
were lying unused in public laboratories because the authorities were ineffective in 
cooperating with the private sector to develop commercial applications. Further, the 
corporations claimed that allowing the grantees exclusive licenses over federally-funded 
discoveries would make US companies more competitive and would provide an incentive 
for developing inventions into commercially viable products. 
As a consequence, from 1980 onward a number of measures were passed in order to 
authorize the granting of exclusive marketing licenses to commercial manufacturers of 
government-owned intellectual property.3 The legislation was also intended to encourage 
the identification of technologies with possible commercial applications by public 
laboratories and to favor cooperation schemes (known as CRADAs - Cooperative 
Research and Development Agreements) between the public entities performing R&D 
and private sector partners. This policy progressively extended access to the benefits of 
these schemes from Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), universities and other non-
profit organizations to all contractors, regardless of size. 
As a result of the new legislative framework, contractors who have conducted research 
with public funds now own the rights to commercially exploit new research products and 
government retains little control over how these rights are exercised. 
Regarding R&D carried out by public entities, various incentives are provided for the 
commercialization of innovations achieved in the course of their activity through 
exclusive marketing licenses. This goal is achieved through entitlement of federal re 
searchers and laboratories to part of the royalties generated by the licensing process. 
Critics focus on three possible dangers arising from this trend: 1.  the diversion of scientific bodies, notably the universities, toward increased 
involvement in profit-making research programs, which de facto corrupts their 
traditional vocation of seeking knowledge independently and for purely scientific 
purposes; 
2.  the encouragement of anti-competitive practices: the contractor can legally 
withhold technical information - obtained with the use of public funds - from its 
competitors, thus preventing them from entering the market or increasing their 
own shares; and 
3.  the possibility of monopoly pricing: under the existing legislation, there is poor (if 
any) control over the way that products developed with public funding are 
marketed. This issue is particularly important in the area of life-saving drugs. For 
example, in the case of AZT (used to treat AIDS), the federal government 
apparently has no control over the pricing of the drug and receives no royalties 
from its sale, despite the fact that the drug was developed in government 
laboratories.  
Although the above analysis is based on partial data, R&D policy exemplifies the one-
dimensional character of US policy, which seeks to aid private industrial development, 
while relegating to second place public benefits (including those flowing from real 
competition in the marketplace). 
EU policy in R&D shares some of the concern with "competitiveness" which justifies 
some subsidies and licensing by government in the US. Article 130 of the EC Treaty 
assigns responsibility to the Community for improving its competitiveness by 
strengthening the scientific and technological basis of European industry. The 
Commission has therefore looked favorably on aid for research and development. 
The European Union has adopted a more discriminating approach than the US to the 
balancing of public and private interests in the exploitation of research. Article 92(1) of 
the EEC Treaty, which prohibits market-distorting state aids, does not apply to re search 
funding, which is non-commercial in character. In practice, the Commission distinguishes 
between aid for basic research (which does not directly affect the productive process) and 
aid for applied research.  
In the case of basic research, it allows aid for up to fifty per cent of R&D costs, as a 
general rule. In the case of applied research, the Commission's attitude depends on the 
probable effect on the relevant market. Normally, it allows state aid up to 25% of the cost 
of R&D, with larger amounts allowed for small and medium enterprises, companies 
operating in backward regions, and important projects of "common European interest." 
Nevertheless, in order to level the playing field for European enterprises relative to 
businesses in other industrialized world regions, aid up to 75% of basic research R&D 
costs and 50% of other R&D may be authorized if such levels of subsidization are 
attained by programs located outside of the EU. This exception is in keeping with the 
World Trade Organization agreement on subsidies and compensatory measures. (b) Industrial Development Bonds:  
For the past fifty years, development in backward areas of the US has been encouraged 
by use of financial instruments called Industrial Development Bonds (IDBs). 
IDBs are tax-exempt bonds issued by state and local governments to finance the purchase 
of land, structures, and equipment for private enterprises. Infrastructure and equipment 
for the beneficiaries under a rental plan is geared to the repayment of the investment, plus 
the administrative costs. At the end of the lease, the facilities are transferred to the 
recipient firm for a nominal amount. The public funding covers 10% of the investment 
and is frequently part of a plan including tax deductions and property tax abatement. 
The advantages for the beneficiaries consist of: 
1.  reduced interest rates due to the tax-exempt status of IDBs; 
2.  deduction of the rent paid for the facilities from the taxable company's revenue; 
3.  exemption, in most cases, from local taxes. 
The impact of advantages outlined above in terms of production costs vary according to 
the configuration of the incentive packages. Analysts estimate that the savings on capital 
costs range from 1.5% to 9.5%, while the labor cost differentials between 56%. The total 
volume of outstanding IDBs for manufacturing amounted in 1993 to approximately $113 
billion. 
The public objectives pursued by IDBs are:  
1.  helping small and medium enterprises (SMEs); 
2.  directing investment to depressed regions; and 
3.  stimulating investment in general. 
The effectiveness of IDBs has been criticized with particular regard to the last two 
criteria. It is admitted that IDBs can actually close the 'capital gap' of SMEs compared to 
the credit avenues generally open to large companies. Yet, cost-benefit studies indicate 
that the role of such incentives in directing capital to backward areas tends to be 
neutralized by the availability of IDBs in most states. Concerning the aim of stimulating 
new initiatives, various surveys indicate that only a minority of the IDB-financed 
investment would not have taken place without the subsidy. 
It is significant that, from their inception in 1936 until 1968, no federal control on the use 
of IDBs existed. The tax exemption was allowed on the ground of the constitutional 
doctrine of reciprocal immunity from taxation among different levels of government. In 
1968, 1982, and 1984, some limits were introduced on the value of IDBs entitled to tax-
exempt status (a cap of $10 million), on the projects eligible to tax-exempt financing 
(through exclusion of 'luxury' investments), on the aggregate amount allowed to a single 
beneficiary ($40 million), and finally on the volume of bonds issued ($150 per capita, per 
state). These limitations have regulated, but not eliminated, IDBs, and the questions about 
public benefits achieved through these schemes persist. According to a report by the US 
General Accounting Office (GAO), the goals of job creation, development of 
economically-distressed areas, fostering of start-up companies, and keeping 
manufacturing firms in the country have been at best only partially attained, while the 
federal government currently forgoes over $2 billion in tax revenue annually. 
An in-depth GAO review of three states representing about 20% of all IDBs in the year of 
the survey - Ohio, Indiana and New Jersey - showed that: 
1.  about $223 million of IDBs were issued in 1991; 
2.  for the 68 projects financed with IDBs in that year, only seven involved start-up 
companies and only sixteen were located in areas of high unemployment; 
3.  only one project would have been relocated elsewhere without IDB financing. 
Though twelve states issued no IDBs at the time of the GAO's report, there is no 
indication that the states refused to do so because of lack of interest in regional 
development. 
Applying EU criteria, most of the initiatives for which IDBs were used in the US would 
not have been eligible for regional aid in Europe because of the generality of their 
objectives, the loose rationale for the benefit to the interested business in term s of 
reduced interest rates (the tax exemption for the investors could be construed as a general 
measure), and the general lack of stringent criteria for ensuring that the projects were 
exclusively concerned with regional development.  
In the European system, regions wishing to benefit from regional aid are the subject of 
precise criteria defined in the EC treaty (Article 92 (3), sub (a) and (c), plus the detailed 
method laid down in the implementing provisions of the Commission services). In the 
US, however, states and municipalities are not selected for regional development 
assistance by any central process, thereby becoming eligible for IDB financing. Further, 
no criteria are normally set within states to discriminate between advanced and 
disadvantaged areas with respect to schemes eligible for use of IDBs. 
(c) Bailing out failing businesses 
: Financial aid to failing businesses in the US is a topic of special interest to European 
observers. The federal government has come to the aid of relatively few companies, and 
in all such cases critics have been concerned about the use of taxpayers' money, the 
involvement of large corporate interests, and the consequences for free competition of 
government intervention.  
The US does not have a formal policy justifying government intervention in the case of 
businesses facing impending insolvency and liquidation. But a series of crises in the 
seventies and eighties led to assistance programs for large companies such as Chrysler, 
Lockheed and some Northeastern railroads, as well as for the city of New York. The GAO has developed specific guidelines based on previous experience. Congress would 
use these guidelines in exercising its exclusive decision-making power to grant federal 
aid to failing companies. 
The railroads attracted the first extensive governmental aid program. Railroads in the US 
(though all private companies until recently) have been partially exempted from the 
normal consequences of filing for bankruptcy because, as utilities, it is assumed that they 
will have to continue to provide service, if necessary through reorganization. In 1974, 
prompted by the deep financial crisis facing eight bankrupt or nearly bankrupt railroad 
companies, Congress approved a package of loans, loan guarantees, and grants in order to 
protect the operations of these companies. Further, it established a publicly created quasi-
private company - Conrail - to take charge of operating a consolidated freight rail system. 
Since 1974, the federal government has given substantial aid to Conrail, including some 
$7 billion at the time of its creation, $2.8 billion for settling the bankruptcies of the 
antecedent companies, and relief from public service operations. Nevertheless, Conrail 
has never been permanently profitable and has sold off some of its assets. 
The Lockheed aircraft corporation was a second major recipient of government aid to 
industry. In 1971, Lockheed was suffering severe financial problems, having lost some 
$86.3 million in 1970 alone. Lockheed's difficulties were tied to those of Rolls Royce in 
the United Kingdom, since the latter was to supply jet engines for Lockheed's new 
airliner, the L1011. As a result of an appeal by the management of Lockheed (supported 
by the British government) to the federal authorities, Congress passed the Emergency 
Loan Guarantee Act, allowing for up to $250 million in loan guarantees to Lockheed. 
The Treasury's intervention enabled Lockheed to gradually recover from its crisis, 
winning back the creditors' trust, finalizing some major production programs, and 
eventually giving up the government's guarantee in 1977. The public aid was motivated 
by the high number of jobs at risk (about 60,000 between Lockheed itself and its 
suppliers), the potential GDP loss (estimated at $120 to $475 million), the implications 
for national defense (Lockheed was a major defense contractor) and, significantly, the 
consequences for competition in the aerospace industry (the disappearance of Lockheed 
would have left only two competitors in the commercial aerospace industry). 
New York City was also a recipient of substantial amounts of aid. Financial interventions 
by the state and the federal government were motivated by the foreseeable consequences 
of a default of a municipality as large as New York City on the banking system (that is, 
on the hundreds of banks to which NYC was in debt and the municipal bond markets 
managed through banks or other financial institutions all over the US), on US financial 
stability, and on world monetary stability. The approach taken to such a critical situation 
does not differ - in terms of ways and means - from the treatment of major crises that 
occur in the private sector. 
The federal aid to New York included short-term loans of up to $2.3 billion and federally 
guaranteed city bonds of up to $1.54 billion, plus substantial additional funds from 
private sources. The aid package provided for appropriate monitoring, reform o f the municipal accounting system, and balancing of the city's budget in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. By 1993, the budget was balanced and the city 
was able to reenter the credit markets. 
The Chrysler automobile company provides the last important example of state 
intervention. As the aid took the form of loan guarantees for a major industrial company, 
this case can be likened to the Lockheed rescue. The main differences lie in the larger 
amount mobilized for Chrysler ($1.5 billion) and the concessions given by creditors and 
other interested parties to match federal assistance. 
In the late seventies, Chrysler reported heavy losses ($1,126 million in 1979) and was 
approaching bankruptcy. Federal assistance was authorized on the following grounds: 
1.  the number of jobs at stake and the likely regional effects of the corporation's 
default (134,000 workers concentrated in an area, Detroit, with a high rate of 
unemployment); 
2.  The consequences for competition in the car industry, as the loss of Chrysler 
would have left the US market with only two major producers; 
3.  the role of Chrysler as a defense contractor; and  
4.  possible increased market penetration by foreign competitors, with consequent 
implications for the US balance of payments. 
In further contrast to the Lockheed case (where the main issue was overcoming a cash 
flow crisis), the viability of Chrysler was carefully considered as a condition of the aid. 
As a result, the Chrysler assistance program approved by Congress required al l direct 
and indirect beneficiaries (US and foreign banks, other creditors, stockholders, suppliers, 
dealers, and employees) to make some concessions. In addition, restrictions on dividends, 
inspections of books, audits, and previous approval by the governmental authorities of 
major asset sales, contracts, as well as operating and financial plans were imposed. The 
operation involved the temporary sale of some of Chrysler's shares using government 
warrants. These warrants were later bought by Chrysler itself in a public distribution 
where the company was the highest bidder. Only $1.2 billion of the $1.5 billion guarantee 
package was actually used. Chrysler was again profitable by 1982, thanks especially to 
the downsizing of its operations and the lowering of its break-even point. 
The GAO considers the Chrysler program successful, despite the lay-offs resulting from 
the restructuring measures. In particular, it credits the guarantees granted to Chrysler with 
having allowed restructuring to take place with less interruption of the firm's operations 
than would have been the case in a bankruptcy. 
Comparing American and European practice: 
The review of public subsidies in the previous section is no more than cursory. Its 
purpose is simply to cover some areas that provide a basis for comparison with the 
regulatory framework and practice of EU state aid policy as part of competition policy. Though limited in scope, this exercise provides sufficient material for some tentative 
conclusions on the US situation. 
From the point of view of a practitioner of European law, subsidies in the US offer a 
varied picture that can be summarized as follows: 
(a) Subsidies have not been uniformly successful: for example, while the industrial rescue 
plans have worked, support for R&D and reduced interest loans for local developers 
through the IDBs have been questionable in their intent and their outcomes; 
(b) Subsidies have no clear relationship to preservation of the free competitive market so 
central to American economic philosophy. 
The subsidy allocation and review processes in the two systems have both similarities 
and significant differences. In both, one finds: 
1.  enterprises seeking reduced costs or other benefits; 
2.  regions or territories interested in economic development; 
3.  individual investors looking for tax-exempt or tax-reduced income; 
4.  creditors or shareholders of firms in financial difficulty; 
5.  public authorities entrusted with the right to grant subsidies and concessions;  and 
sometimes 
6.  a watchdog body (in the EU case, the Commission); 
7.  taxpayers, usually in a passive role. 
In the American case, a pluralistic process occurs by which each player attempts 
individually or in alliance with others to affect the initial decision. While the players 
converge around an authority that has the power to decide on specific cases, t hat 
authority may not have a watchdog role and it may have no explicit concern with 
preserving the level playing field so central to European notions of competition policy 
and subsidy control. 
The working of this process virtually requires, for fairness' sake, the insertion of a third 
party - other than the would-be recipient and the government body solicited for aid - 
whose task is to ensure that decisions on particular cases take account of the interests of 
consumers and competitors. The EU provides this third party in the agency of the 
Commission, which is the independent body charged with assessing and deciding upon 
almost all measures of state aid proposed or adopted by state, regional and local 
authorities. The only exceptions are minor subsidies, dealt with under a de minimis rule, 
that are presumed to be so small as to be unlikely to distort competition. 
The American process, in contrast, seems likely to produce outcomes that are both 
economically irrational and distorting to competition. Since subsidies are granted on an 
ad hoc, individual basis and by a process of bilateral negotiation between the applicant 
and the grantor, neither consistency nor protection of broader interests is assured. The 
cases of the IDB bonds, the commercialization of publicly funded R&D, and the bidding wars between states for inward investment certainly offer no reassurance. However, when 
both the Federal government and Congress have been involved - as in the Chrysler, 
Lockheed and New York City cases - the outcome has generally been better. The 
involvement of Congress and the Executive branch has practically made up for the 
absence of anti-trust rules applicable to subsidies. These bodies - and especially Congress 
- constitute the needed "third party." 
The results in the bailout cases - and the subsequent judgments of the GAO, which acts as 
an evaluator of government operations - sustain this impression of success. The rescue 
plans have produced a better outcome than the eventual bankruptcy of the companies 
would have entailed, not only with respect to the preservation of jobs but also measured 
against the companies' ability to return to normal operation in the market within a 
reasonable deadline. The 1979 Chrysler program has been characterized as the most 
sophisticated of recent cases in terms of its embodiment of commercial lending principles 
in the program's structure, with precautions built in against default and with concessions 
from all associated with the firm, including the creditors and the shareholders, and 
restrictions on the decision-making powers of the company's management. 
Such results were possible in the Lockheed, Chrysler and New York cases because of the 
involvement of both the Administration and the Congress. Congress has played an 
instrumental, arbitrating role, setting out detailed and strict conditions in ad hoc 
legislation, which favored successful implementation of the bailout programs. The use of 
parliamentary procedure ensured full representation and expression of all relevant 
interests and gave all players a say. Further, the Administration was closely and actively 
associated in the management of the rescue packages.  
None of this applied in the cases of the R&D investments, the IDBs, and the states' 
bidding wars over investment incentives. The R&D case needs most explanation, since in 
this instance both Congress and the Administration were involved. The virtually 
unconditional funding of R&D and transfer of resultant discoveries to the private 
companies clearly calls out for a more sophisticated approach to subsidies than is usually 
adopted in bilateral negotiation. Apparently, the process failed in this case because of a 
distorted perception by Congress of the interests at stake. Public funding of private 
research and/or private use of publicly-funded technology have been inaccurately 
identified with the public interest, probably because of the influence of the dominant 
political ideology of the Reagan/Bush period and because of relentless lobbying by the 
eventual beneficiaries. 
As for the reduced interest loans made possible through the IDB schemes, they had 
limited impact on regional development. It was difficult to secure investment and new 
jobs without offering prospective investors incentives equivalent to those available in 
neighboring states. Quite simply, the competition between states had the effect of 
neutralizing the advantages offered by incentives and substantially raising the costs (and 
reducing the benefits) for the eventual winner.  At the local level, IDBs offered clear advantages to individual municipalities. Attracting 
income-generating businesses improves the tax base of municipalities, adds to the 
incomes of other businesses and citizens, and improves the municipalities' standing with 
creditors and bond-rating bodies. 
The current political climate, emphasizing large-scale cutbacks in public spending, does 
not improve the prospects either for regional development subsidies or for a more rational 
approach to those now available. 
Inner-city initiatives: 
Any survey of local development subsidies in the US would be incomplete without 
discussion of (Federal) Empowerment Zones (Fess) and (State) Enterprise Zones (EZs).  
The FEZs and EZs are specially designated areas entitled to tax breaks, grants, wage 
credits and a wide range of general interest programs (such as social services, crime 
prevention, and job training). They are intended to attract new investment and to 
concentrate the efforts of different public agencies in order to revive socially and 
economically blighted communities. 
Currently, there are nine FEZs (chosen nationally) and over three thousand EZs 
designated by state legislation in thirty-seven states. 
Because these schemes offer resources to all enterprises, sectors and residents, they 
resemble what the EU would define as general measures rather than the kind of state aid 
covered by Article 92 (1) of the EC Treaty. They would therefore be subject to much less 
strict control, as provided for in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty, though there is a gray 
area between the topics covered under these articles and those covered by Article 92. 
The important point is that the FEZs and EZs differ significantly from the IDB-funded 
initiatives. They represent an attempt to focus and concentrate public resources on 
particular areas, though this is more the case with the FEZs (of which there are only nine) 
than with the several thousand EZs, which tend to disperse resources. 
It is too early to evaluate the FEZs (which were only created in 1994, with funding of 
$3.5 billion). Nevertheless, the empowerment and enterprise zones are distinctive (when 
compared to the IDBs) in that they focus on the objective of regional development; are 
structured according to priorities set by a public authority; and they break out of the 
bilateral framework between prospective investors and local authorities by using a 
framework that allows consideration of the various interests involved in the use of public 
resources. 
Implications for the EU: 
What lessons does an examination of American treatment to subsidies suggest for the 
EU? The EU Commission is currently devoting greater attention to state aid. The number of 
cases examined has increased, the accounts of public and state-controlled companies are 
scrutinized more closely, and proposals for aid to troubled firms are considered more 
critically. 
The cases involving rescuing and restructuring firms are among the most controversial 
that the Commission has to examine. All such cases tend to stir up public debate and to 
call into question the way in which the Commission uses its discretionary power. Since 
1994, The Financial Times has been running a series of articles that are highly critical of 
the Commission's implementation of the rules on state aid.4 These articles do not 
ordinarily address the bulk of undisputed decisions approving aid for small firms or aid 
with regional or sectoral objectives. Rather, they focus on cases of rescuing and/or 
restructuring in highly competitive sectors (such as Bull in the computer industry and Air 
France or Iberia in the airline industry). In such cases, they commonly hint at political 
manipulation by the Commission. 
The Financial Times traditionally echoes the views of business, legal and administrative 
elites in Europe, and the criticism comes at a time when a growing number of 
Commission decisions are being challenged not only by Member-States but by parties 
with direct stakes in the decisions. 
Since the critics aim particularly at the discretionary powers of the Commission - 
implying that such discretion is used for political purposes - the idea of transferring this 
discretion to an independent competition office acquired currency in the discussions 
leading up to this year's Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). 
It is always tempting to believe that setting up a new specialized agency would lead to 
more rational decisions. But in this case (as in many others) the proposal does not tackle 
the underlying causes of the problems afflicting the Commission. Setting up a new body 
would work only if the new agency truly had greater independence than Directorate 
General IV (the Commission's body now responsible for competition policy) and had 
independent powers of enforcement. To establish such a body would require great 
boldness as well as unanimity on the part of Member-States. 
The chances are that, instead, the Commission will have to live with and adopt its 
decisions under the present legal rules and with the administrative structures now in 
place, albeit with some modifications. One probable change, flowing from the 
Commission's own initiative, will involve implementation of Article 94 of the EC Treaty 
to exempt from scrutiny types of aid that do not affect intra-European competition. Such 
aid can best be dealt with by national governments, and this approach would be 
consistent with the present emphasis on subsidiarity5 (Article 3b of the EC Treaty). Such 
a change would allow the Commission to concentrate its attention on cases having a 
European dimension. 
Some improvements in present practice are, however, possible, especially in cases 
involving aid to failing businesses and cities. The present European approach to such issues is embodied in guidelines issued by the Commission in July 1994, which update 
the policy outlines in the Eighth Report on Competition Policy, published in 1979.6 
Compared with the American initiatives in the 1970s, this approach is well conceived, 
but lacks adequate enforcement powers. The procedure requires (in the case of 
companies) submission of a credible restructuring plan aimed at restoring the financial 
health and viability of the company in question within a reasonable time. Once a plan is 
approved, its implementation depends on an annual report submitted by the appropriate 
national authority, which offers relevant information to enable the Commission to ensure 
that the provisions of the plan are being enforced. 
This reporting requirement reflects the overall weakness of the Commission and its 
dependence on Member-State governments for cooperation in enforcement.7 It is clearly 
inadequate as a procedure for direct and close enforcement. It may be noted that the main 
criticism leveled by observers of EC policy on state aid is that somehow subsidies are 
approved periodically and repeatedly to the same recipients, departing from the principle 
of "one-time" aid that should be a feature of all rescue schemes. This suggests that the 
Commission lacks enforcement powers and that the involvement of Member-States 
undermines the "one-time" principle. 
By contrast, the virtue of the American approach has been that Congress and the 
Executive Branch have been directly and closely involved in management of plans 
approved by Congress. Congress and the administration have not only been arbitrators 
between those seeking assistance and their creditors but have taken direct responsibility 
for negotiations with creditors and trade unions. 
This procedure cannot simply be copied in the EU. Whatever the media suggests, in all 
comparable cases the Commission only acts when it receives a plan drafted at the 
national level that has already been accepted and funded. Indeed, such plans often take no 
account of Community law. Admittedly, the Commission may (pursuant to Article 93 (2) 
of the EC Treaty) conduct an investigation into the case and may make its approval 
conditional upon acceptance of certain requirements (compliance with which must be 
covered by the annual reporting mentioned above). But in reality this procedure gives 
little leeway for negotiation with Member-State governments, who have already reached 
a complex settlement under the internal political and legal constraints to which they are 
subject. 
The idea of a direct involvement of the Commission in enforcement of restructuring 
plans, analogous to American practice, thus runs up against constitutional objections 
arising from subsidiarity and the lack of positive legal powers. In practice, it would also 
require staffing and expertise greater than the Commission now has. 
Yet the Commission could handle rescue packages better if the following principles were 
applied: 
1.  The principle of "one-time" aid should be applied stringently, accompanied by an 
understanding that rescue aid can be allowed only once in a decade. Aid granted more often almost certainly has a distorting effect on competition and on trade 
between Member-States; 
2.  The Commission should insist that concessions be made by parties interested in 
the future of a company before formal approval of a rescue package is granted. 
Such concessions might involve temporary suspension of dividend payments and 
partial waiving of credit. Employee's interests would not have to be sacrificed. In 
this respect the Commission can use its discretion to assert social interests over 
purely economic considerations; 
3.  All financial and other assistance provided to the beneficiary should be paid in 
installments, payment of each portion to depend on evidence of compliance with 
precise conditions designed to monitor the firm's performance; 
4.  The rescue and restructuring plan should be endorsed by an appropriate national 
auditing and financial body, which should also be directly involved in monitoring 
the plan's progress and which should formally assent before the release of further 
installments of aid; 
5.  In the interests of transparency, information about a proposal should be published 
before the Commission makes a decision. Such publication would make clear how 
much discretion the Commission actually enjoys in such cases; 
6.  Consistent with the "private investor" principle commonly applied by the 
Commission, the beneficiary of a proposed aid package should be expected to 
obtain adequate financial guarantees and some risk compensation should be 
included in the aid package. Merchant banks normally require such steps when 
negotiating rescue plans, and this requirement would put pressure on the 
beneficiary to comply with the plan's provisions and deadlines and would assure 
observers that the program incorporated commercial lending principles. 
These recommendations do not require amendments to the Treaties or to its implementing 
legislation. Their adoption would only involve publication of a Commission notice so as 
to ensure transparency of the criteria being applied.  
Whatever the value of these recommendations, we may conclude, perhaps as a paradox, 
that the experience of the US - a country that has no state aid policy and does not refer to 
public subsidies in its anti-trust laws - may be useful for the improvement o f European 
law in its treatment of state aid to companies threatened with bankruptcy and collapse.  REFERENCES 
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Notes  
1 Anti-trust rules derive from Articles 85-86 of the EC Treaty and Articles 65-66 of the 
ECSC Treaty; control of mergers and concentrations from Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 and 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty; control of state aids from Articles 92-93 of the ECSC 
Treaty and Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty; and rules applying to public undertakings 
appear in Articles 90 (1), (2) and (3) of the EC Treaty. 
2 Specifically, Article 3(g) of the EC treaty and Article 4(d) of the ECSC Treaty. 
3 The main pieces of legislation were the Government Patent Policy Act, the Technology 
Innovation Act, the Federal Technology Transfer Act, and the National Competitive 
Technology Transfer Act. 
4 See, for example, "In a flap at feeding time," Financial Times, 11 March 1994, p. 17 
and "Controlling state aids," Financial Times, 19 October 1994, p. 23. See also "A case 
for stricter discipline," Financial Times, 17 February 1995, p. 16 and "More folly in 
banking," Financial Times, 22 February 1995, p. 21. 
5 Subsidiarity is the legal principle within the European Union that policy decisions 
should be taken at the lowest appropriate governmental level (editor). 
6 See especially Paras. 177 and 227-8. 
7 Based on Articles 5, 93(2), 155, and 169 of the EC Treaty. 